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Stephanie Decker 
Corporate Legitimacy and Advertising: British 
Companies and the Rhetoric of Development 
in West Mrica, 1950-1970 
Development, modernity, and industrialization became domi-
nant themes in corporate advertising in Mrica in the 1950S 
and remained prevalent through the following two decades 
while many African nations were gaining independence. Brit-
ish businesses operating there created a publicity strategy that 
couched their presence in less developed countries in terms of 
a commitment and a positive contribution to the progress of 
the new states. Eventually, British companies tried to "Afri-
canize" their corporate image through these campaigns. 
I n the 1930S and 1940S, British business in West Africa was faced with a rising tide of public discontent and criticism. Closely associ-
ated with the British Empire, imperial companies were attacked for 
monopolizing lucrative trades, discriminating against Africans, and col-
luding with colonial governments. After World War II, public disaffec-
tion focused on the close economic cooperation between governments 
and foreign business. African businessmen resented the preferential 
treatment that large merchant firms received in the import-and-export 
trade. But it was the continued high prices of imported goods like 
cloth, caused by a general supply shortage, coupled with relatively 
high incomes in West Africa, a result of the high demand for tropical 
STEPHANIE DECKER is lecturer in International Business at the University of Liverpool 
Management School. 
Acknowledgments: I am indebted to the Arts and Humanities Research Council and the 
University of Liverpool Research Development Fund for funding my doctoral research, out of 
which this paper developed, as well as the Economic and Social Science Research Council, 
which granted me a postdoctoral scholarship. I would also like to thank Stefanie van de 
Kerkhof, Dmitri van den Bersseiaar, Stefan Schwarzkopf, and Gareth Austin for their help and 
comments on earlier drafts. Finally, the archivists of Barc1ays Bank DCO, Unilever, and Bank 
of West Africa (now Standard Chartered) have been unfailingly helpful during my research. I 
am especially grateful for their support in reproducing the images used in this article. 
Business History Review 81 (Spring 2007): 59-86. © 2007 by The President 
and Fellows of Harvard College. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Stephanie Decker / 60 
commodities and raw materials, that prepared the ground for a boy-
cott by African traders and consumers in the Gold Coast in 1947. In 
February 1948, events came to a head after the boycott ended: police 
opened fire on a demonstration in Accra, and widespread unrest en-
sued in the coastal and central areas of the Gold Coast. 1 Rioters tar-
geted the trading companies and looted their shops. British companies 
were not the only ones affected; Lebanese traders, among others, were 
attacked as well. Notably, the most prominent Lebanese, Anastasios G. 
Leventis, was spared, while the worst-hit company was the British 
United Africa Company (UAC), a subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch multi-
national Unilever. Leventis escaped because he was a well-known and 
vocal supporter of the nationalist cause; he had sponsored articles in 
the nationalist newspapers extolling African advancement. 2 Although 
the Lebanese traders were far from popular, the UAC was even more 
reviled. In 1948, the bell tolled for foreign companies, and their contin-
ued operation was threatened by the prospect of African nationalists 
taking over their governments in the near future. The year 1948 became 
a political watershed: the Colonial Office accepted the necessity of 
greater African participation and considered that self-government would 
be feasible within one generation. By the early 1950S, the time frame 
for independence had become much shorter. While British officials 
continued to liaise with European companies in West Africa, they had 
also taken steps to distance themselves. Firms that had once been able 
to rely on official support were now too closely associated with the evils 
of colonialism. 
In recent work on business and decolonization, Robert Tignor and 
Sarah Stockwell put forward the view that decolonization was charac-
terized by a widening rift between colonial governments and British 
companies.3 Deteriorating relations with the colonial administration, 
however, pushed business to accept the changed political situation in 
the colonies. Despite areas of difference, colonial governments, African 
politicians, and British business could agree on a development frame-
work, and this consensus aided companies in shifting their political 
1 Aiken Watson, Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Gold 
Coast (London, 1948); Dennis Austin, Politics in Ghana, 1946-1960 (London, 1964),69-77; 
Florence Mabel Bourret, Ghana: The Road to Independence, 1919-1957 (London, 1960), 
168-74; Richard Rathbone, "Introduction," in Ghana. Part I: 1941-1952, ed. Richard Rath-
bone (London, 1992), xliii-xlvii; Sarah Stockwell, The Business of Decolonization (Oxford, 
2000),70-90. Similar disillusion gripped Nigeria, but major riots did not occur. See Toyin 
Falola, Development Planning and Decolonization in Nigeria (Gainesville, 1996), 91. 
2 E. W. Pearce to Mr. Rawlings, 31 Mar. 1947, papers of John Holt & Co. (Liverpool) Ltd., 
mss Mr. s825, 421 A (iii), Rhodes House, Oxford. 
3 This argument has been made by Stockwell, The Business of Decolonizah'on, and Robert 
Tignor, Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire: State and Business in Decoloniz-
ing Egypt, Nigeria, and Kenya, 1945-1963 (Princeton, 1998). 
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networks to the emerging elites in Ghana and Nigeria, a trend that be-
came apparent in the post-independence period.4 
Decolonization forced British companies to overhaul their entire 
operations, including their commercial and political strategies, their 
staffing policy, and their public-relations outreach. Improving their cor-
porate images became essential, as they were determined to outstay the 
empire. One aspect of this new approach was increased advertising to 
African audiences. The corporate image created in these advertise-
ments changed over time as the companies shifted from using imperial 
symbolism in the 1950S to displaying images more representative of the 
new modernism in the 1960s and 1970S. However, they were largely di-
recting their efforts to the elites, whether in the United Kingdom or 
West Africa, underlining the defensive nature of their image overhaul. 
Central to the companies' defense strategy were theories of eco-
nomic development that became influential in the African political econ-
omy during decolonization. Frederick Cooper argues that the focus on 
development and modernization revived imperial aspirations in the Brit-
ish and French colonies, however unsuccessfully.s Popularized ideas of 
economic development and modernization offered both former colonies 
and the imperial metropolis a place and a role in the international sys-
tem.6 New states could make claims on their former rulers, while the 
imperial powers gained an image of benevolence in the twilight of colo-
nialism. This was particularly important in the context of cold-war poli-
tics, a period when the United States was condemning imperialism and 
seeking to include the new states in the Western sphere of influence. 7 
The work of Walt Whitman Rostow, who based his forecast of the prog-
ress of new nations on the historical stages of developed nations' eco-
nomic growth, provided such a general theory of development. 8 
Imperial businesses did not collapse alongside colonialism, but 
4Toyin FaIola argues that late colonial development planning profoundly shaped Nige-
rian conceptions up to 1980. FaIola, Development Planning, xi, 68-70, 91. 
5 Frederick Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French 
and British Africa (New York, 1996),3-4,451-72. The importance of development efforts 
has also been noted by imperial historians such as John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and 
Fall of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1982); Peter Cain and Antony G. Hopkins, British Im-
perialism. II: Crisis and Deconstruction,1914-1990 (London, 1993). 
6 Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard, "Introduction," in International Development 
and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge, eds. Frederick 
Cooper and Randall Packard (Berkeley, 1997), 12, 30. 
7The demise of colonialism has been connected closely with the inability of the former 
Great Powers to maintain their empires in the face of two openly anti-imperialist superpowers. 
John Darwin, "Decolonization and the End of Empire," in The Oxford History of the British 
Empire. Vol. 5: Historiography, eds. R. w. Winks and Alaine Low (Oxford, 1999),548-52. 
BWalt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto 
(Cambridge, 1960). The success of Rostow's work lay in its close fit with cold-war economic 
policies, and his challenging of the Marxist stage theory of development. See Goran Ohlin, "Re-
flections on the Rostow Doctrine," Economic Development and Cultural Change 9 (1961): 654. 
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instead successfully adapted their operations by highlighting their role 
in the economic development of the continent. This provided a frame-
work for them to cooperate, first with colonial governments and then 
with the new African elites, who were promising the electorate political 
independence and economic development.9 Economists like W. Arthur 
Lewis and Dudley Seers were appointed by the Colonial Office and then 
by successor governments to advise on economic policy. Many key 
ideas behind modernization and development theory made their way 
into the political discourse, albeit in simplified form. 10 
British businesspeople were aware of these trends, although they 
were not necessarily privy to the finer points of the debates occurring 
in political and academic circles. Reports by the British government 
sketched out a clear role for foreign business in its programs, as, for ex-
ample, in its accounts of the disturbances in the Gold Coast in 1948. 11 
The clearest evidence of business initiating a role within the new eco-
nomic regime comes from an internal memorandum that was circu-
lated at Barclays in 1961, after six authorities on development econom-
ics had been consulted on the possible role of banking in Nigeria. 12 
Many companies adopted policies that governments perceived as bene-
ficial, and in 1962 Unilever claimed that despite the government's def-
amation of business "the position of the [Nigerian] Government was 
basically the same as that of the Company."13 
Why were companies so willing to engage with contemporary 
thinking about development and to accept political imperatives? Impe-
rial businesses derived new legitimacy from the development efforts of 
the 1950S and 1960s, since they could present themselves as one of the 
few sources of scarce capital, manpower, technology, and skills. This 
claim gave them access to elites in politics and business, a limited say in 
economic policies, and improved standing in African countries. Foreign 
companies inevitably justified their presence in poorer parts of the 
world based on the promise to deliver progress and modernization. 14 
9 Stephanie Decker, "Building Up Goodwill? British Business, Development and Eco-
nomic Nationalism in Ghana and Nigeria" (Ph.D. diss., University of Liverpool, 2006), 89-129. 
10 Tony Killick, Development Economics in Action: A Study of Economic Policies in 
Ghana (London, 1978), 11-32,53-4. 
11 For example, see Watson, Report, para. 241. 
12 "Developing a Middle Class in Nigeria," 20 and 30 Oct. 1961, Barclays Group Archive 
(hereafter BGA), 80/3468. 
13 Unilever Directors' Committee, 358. Nigeria, 11 May 1962, Unilever Historical Archives 
UNI/BD/DC. 
14 The idea that business has to justify its presence in society has been suggested in various 
different contexts. See Roland Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public 
Relations and Corporate Imagery in American Business (Berkeley, 1998), 7-47; Stefan 
Schwarzkopf, "They Do It with Mirrors: Advertising and British Cold War Consumer Politics," 
Contemporary British History 19 (2005): 137-43; Timothy O'Brien, "The Revolutionary Mis-
sion: American Enterprise in Cuba," American Historical Review 98 (1993): 765-67, 781-84· 
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However, by the mid to late 1960s, belief in rapid progress was 
wearing thin. Ghana and Nigeria experienced coups in 1966, events that 
coincided with the radicalization of political and economic debates and 
increasing hostility to foreign business in many developing countries. 15 
As Western-advocated, noncommunist development failed in West M-
rica, its legitimacy eroded, and expropriations became a growing threat. 
The argument that development themes entered advertising during 
decolonization has been made by Anandi Ramamurthy, who studies 
how Africans were represented to Europeans.16 However, as she does 
not analyze the shift in corporate representations to reflect the firms' 
position in African host countries, the extent to which the emphasis on 
progress and development was not just a European concern but also an 
African one is obscured.17 
My focus in this article is on how advertisements reflected corpo-
rate intentions, not on consumer perceptions. Advertising was only 
one tool of a wider communication strategy.18 British companies used 
advertising to distance themselves from their old imperial identity. 
Hence, representations of Africans in corporate ads evolved in parallel 
with events, and they came to be shown not just as bystanders and con-
sumers but increasingly as also occupying positions of responsibility. 19 
The following analysis of corporate-image ads begins with a discus-
sion of a film that advocated the use of savings accounts in West Africa. 
Due to its success, however, the film became influential in shaping the 
sponsoring bank's future campaigns and in constructing its corporate 
image in Ghana and Nigeria. Print ads that were subsequently pub-
lished during the 1950S and 1960s illustrate the changes in the repre-
sentation of Africans. One ad from the 1970S, discussed here, illustrates 
15 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London, 1968); 
Walter Bernecker and Thomas Fischer, "Rise and Decline of Latin American Dependency 
Theories; Itinerario 22 (1998): 25-45: Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Af-
rica (London, 1972); Samir Amin, Neo-colonialism in West Africa (Harmondsworth, 1973). 
Nevertheless, it is too simple to say that this trend ended with the 1970s, as many scholars 
continued to argue along those lines; see, for example, Toyin Falola, Britain and Nigeria: 
Exploitation or Development? (London, 1987). 
16 Anandi Ramamurthy, Imperial Persuaders: Images of Africa and Asia in British Ad-
vertising (Manchester, 2003). 
17 Cooper and Packard, "Introduction," 4, 12, 18, 30. 
18 The textual analysis of ads is based on an essay by Roland Barthes, "The Rhetoric of the 
Image," in Image, Music, Text (Glasgow, 1977),33-47. Varda Langholz Leymore, in her book 
Hidden Myth: Structure and Symbolism in Advertising (London, 1975), viii, x, focuses on 
the interaction with value systems in society, while John Sinclair, Images Incorporated: Ad-
vertising as Industry and Ideology (London, 1987), 4-5, 29, emphasizes that ads are part of 
wider corporate strategies. 
19This underscores that British companies in Africa increasingly Africanized their "shop 
front" and their management, and between the mid-1960s and the 1980s most firms had al-
most fully Africanized their top management cadres. 
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how business employed an Africanized corporate image to defend its 
presence on the continent. The final section argues that these ad cam-
paigns addressed mainly elites, such as politicians, investors, and busi-
nessmen in Africa and Europe. 
Barclays' Put una moneyfor there, 1956 
Branch banking was changed in the 1950S by the Africanization of 
commodity marketing and trade.20 The foreign merchant companies 
followed a strategy of spatial centralization and product diversification 
after the war. This strategy came about as much for political as for com-
mercial reasons, and it took colonial development plans into consider-
ation.21 Industrialization and limited import substitution became im-
portant features of economic policy in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria. 22 
Hence, trading companies shifted their focus and began manufacturing 
some of the goods they once shipped. They withdrew from their wide-
spread network of small trading stations, which they usually passed on to 
their African agents in a general move from small-scale retail to whole-
sale operations and department stores. In line with African demands and 
the wishes of the colonial government, they left "simple" economic activ-
ity to locals and pioneered more technology-intensive ventures. 23 
In contrast to the trading companies, the banks expanded. In Brit-
ish West Africa, two banks predominated: the Bank of British West Af-
rica (BBWA), founded in 1894; and the Colonial Bank, founded in 1916, 
which amalgamated with other regional banks into Barclays Bank Do-
minion, Colonial & Overseas (DCO), in 1925.24 After World War II, 
some foreign and indigenous banks opened. BBWA and Barclays, how-
ever, remained the largest branch bankers, and both expanded signifi-
cantly in the 1950s. Initially, they conducted business largely with ex-
patriate companies and had branches only in the largest cities. Nigeria 
20 Antony G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa (Harlow, 1973), 273-80. 
21 Decker, "Building Up Goodwill?" 89-99, 109-16. 
22 For Ghana, see Miatta Fahnbulleh, "The Elusive Quest for Industrialisation in Africa: A 
Comparative Study of Ghana and Kenya, c.1950-2000" (Ph.D. diss., London School of Eco-
nomics, 2005). 
23 This was referred to as redeployment, and was endorsed early on by colonial govern-
ments; see Watson, Report, para 241; United Africa Company, "Redeployment; Statistical 
and Economic Review 28 (London, 1963), 1-38; Peter Kilby, Industrialisation in an Open 
Economy: Nigeria, 1945-66 (Cambridge, 1969), 53-80; Hopkins, An Economic History, 
276-79; Stockwell, The Business of Decolonization, 152-57; D. K. Fieldhouse, Merchant 
Capital and Economic Decolonization: The United Africa Company, 1929-1987 (Oxford, 
1994) , 679-715. 
24 For a short account of the foundation of the banks, see Richard Fry, Bankers in West 
Africa: The History o/the British Bank o/West Africa (London, 1976), 23-29, 91-93, 101-2. 
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had the lowest bank-branch density of the entire British colonial em-
pire; the Gold Coast, the sixth lowest. 25 Hence, the two banks' services 
to companies like the UAC, which operated a network of hundreds of 
trading stations, was limited, because the company carried its own 
coin, organized transfers between its branches, and advanced credit to 
local traders and farmers. When the trading companies withdrew from 
the scene, they left vast tracts of territory with no external finance apart 
from indigenous credit institutions, which operated on a smaller scale. 
Neither the colonial government nor the emerging African nationalist 
elites wanted this situation to remain in place. 
Nationalists criticized British banks for not giving credit to Afri-
cans and serving only foreign business. They claimed that this selectiv-
ity was due to racism, while the banks argued that many African cus-
tomers lacked creditworthiness.26 Both colonial governments and their 
nationalist successors also wanted to increase the internal savings rate 
in order to finance further development projects, as it was widely un-
derstood in political and economic circles in Europe, North America, 
and Africa that this was how poor countries could be developed. 27 Both 
BBWA and Barclays began to expand their branch networks, particu-
larly in the early 1950S, and started to compete, initially for local sav-
ings and later also for overdrafts and credits. 
This was the background that led Barclays to order a cinema spot 
from the English Larkin Studios, a state-of-the-art British animation 
studio.28 This film presented a fairly traditional, colonial view of Africa, 
25 Measured by the total number of branches in relation to population figures. See Walter 
Newlyn, "The Colonial Empire," in Banking in the Commonwealth, ed. Richard Sayers (Ox-
ford, 1952), 450. 
26 The bankers' notion of creditworthiness nevertheless had racist undertones, as bankers 
assumed that Africans were stealing and lying (especially from Europeans) whenever pos-
sible. Whether this (mutual) distrust between Africans and Europeans really resulted in 
higher levels of fraud is unclear. Moreover, property rights in Africa could not always be 
passed on to Europeans. Especially with regard to land rights, the situation was complicated. 
Colonial governments made African-owned land in many parts of the colonies inalienable to 
foreigners, in order to prevent settlements and plantations. While this policy benefited inde-
pendent African farmers, it made it difficult for local owners to mortgage their land or prop-
erty to a foreign bank, since the bank could not take up the title. Hence, Africans had diffi-
culty providing security for loans. On the nature of property rights, see Gareth Austin, Land, 
Labour and Capital in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante,18o?-19S6 (Roches-
ter, N.Y., 2005), 443-45, 453-54. 
27 Mobilizing savings and expanding financial institutions were presented as key features 
for take-off in w. w. Rostow, "The Take-off into Self-sustained Growth," Economic Journal 
66 (1956): 29-30, 38-40, 46-47. See also w. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development with 
Unlimited Supplies of Labour," Manchester School (May 1954): 416. "Big-push" develop-
ment economics were embraced by Nkrumalt's government; and acceptance of these ideas 
was widespread. See Killick, Development Economics in Action, 17-20. 
28 Larkin Studios featured heavily in a recent three-part documentary on the history of 
British animation shown on BBC3,Animation Nation, especially in the first part on advertis-
ing, "The Art of Persuasion." 
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Removed for copyright reasons 
Pictures from the booklet that accompanied the film Put una money f or there produced by 
Barclays Bank DCO. (Source: videotape, BGA 1114/1; concertina leaflet, BGA 1174/36. Cour-
tesy of Barclays Group Archives, Barclays Bank, U.K.) 
as the depiction of the village and the simple clothing worn by the par-
ticipants indicates. However, there were some hints of the moderniza-
tion that was beginning to take place in the Mrican countryside: the in-
side of a hut has electric light, and a farmer travels to the Barclays 
branch on a unicycle. The branch building itself is depicted as having 
colonial-style architecture. 
The savings film was a great success, winning the Grand Prix du 
Festival at the International Festival of Advertising Film-Makers at 
Cannes in 1956. Even more important, it was hugely popular with West 
African audiences.29 This reception had not been foreseen. Indeed the 
local director, Leonard Daldry, had tried to stop the release of the film, 
as he was concerned that the opening scene showing three African 
farmers sliding down palm trees made them look like monkeys and 
would be considered offensive by local audiences.30 He was eventually 
overruled. 
Once the film was finally released, much of its success was attributed 
to the soundtrack: highlife music composed and performed by the Ghana-
ian Sam Akpabot in West African Pidgin. The film addressed some West 
African sensibilities more successfully than its creators had anticipated. 
In his memoirs, the British expatriate banker Hugh Norris recalled: 
The cartoon proved to be an instant sensation of the very best kind: 
audiences roared with laughter, particularly at the second farmer 
29 Barclays Bank DCO, Board Minutes,ledger vol. 9, 22 Mar. 1956, 38; 27 Sept. 1956, 129; 
BGA38/511. 
30 Hugh Norris, "A Little Family History, Part l1tree-My Own Story, Book Four: 1949-
1984, "Overseas Banking," 70, BGA 1083/1. 
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being robbed by his wife. The film had originally been assigned a 
useful life of no more than one year, and was succeeded by others; 
but its successors were pale shadows by comparison, and the origi-
nal cartoon continued to playa part in our publicity right up until 
the time I left Nigeria in 1968.31 
It is revealing that the audience reacted to the scene between the 
husband and wife. Conflicting demands on people's incomes are still per-
ceived as difficult by many Ghanaians and Nigerians. Family members 
and the wider community expect generosity from successful individuals 
as a marker of achievement. These demands can quickly outstrip the do-
nor's funds. While flaunting one's wealth is acceptable, many are keen to 
keep the true extent of their financial position hidden in order to discour-
age people from seeking their support.32 Fear of borrowers could be as 
pressing a concern to African audiences as fear of robbery. Hence the ad, 
despite its naive setting and simple structure, offered a symbolic solution 
to the problem of how to deal with wealth and the social obligations that 
come with it. Douglas Holt has pointed out that ads which refer to press-
ing contemporary issues in a society have often been immensely success-
ful, and he refers to them as a form of "iconic branding."33 
A more far-reaching explanation relates to what Holt describes as 
the social and historical backdrop that makes an iconic ad so relevant. 
While the film's animation was slick by the standards of the 1950S, and 
the story featured dilemmas with which audiences could identify, the 
success of Put una money hinged on the music. Ghana in the 1950S was 
a musical trendsetter through its creation of the "highlife" style, which 
dated from the 1930S but became hugely successful and influential in 
the 1950S, fueled by the contribution of musicians like E. T. Mensah. 
Highlife was not just popular entertainment: musicians openly sup-
ported the nationalist politician Kwame Nkrumah in their lyrics and 
with their performances.34 Barclays' Put una money tapped a rich cul-
tural chord through its choice of music. "The sound track of the film 
was frequently played," noted Brian Macdona, a manager visiting from 
the London head office in 1958. "The reaction of the public to the 'High-
Life' tune was, I gather, vociferous. The crowd sang and stamped their 
31 Norris, "Overseas Banking," 70. 
3'W. W. Milne, "General Report on Visit to West Mrica," 9 June 1946, 6, BGA 38/906; 
Jean-Frant;Ois Bayart, The State in Africa: The Politics o/the Belly (London, 1993), 242-43. 
33 Douglas Holt, How Brands Become Icons: The Principles 0/ Cultural Branding (Bos-
ton, 2004), 6-10. 
34The particular importance of highlife music for anticolonial nationalism and post-
independence nation building lay in the nontribal, yet specifically African, even pan-African, cre-
dentials of its heritage. See John Collins, "A Social History of Ghanaian Popular Entertainment 
since Independence," Transactions o/the Historical Society o/Ghana, n.s. 9 (2005): 19-24. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Stephanie Decker / 68 
feet to the rhythm of the music and there was a very great demand for 
the concertina leaflets. "35 
Another incident described by Macdona took place at a funeral 
procession of about one thousand people in Cape Coast that reveals 
how closely the bank had become associated with the ad. 
The solemnity of the occasion was slightly impaired when one very 
grave and important looking gentleman who was reaching-in full 
voice-for the "Rock of Ages" -caught sight of [the new manager in 
Cape Coast], popped his head in the car, said "Ab, Barclays Bank, 
Put Una Money for There," winked violently, beamed, resumed his 
place in the procession and took up the hymn, again in fine voice.36 
While none of these incidents indicate any political connection, it 
seems that Barclays, through its choice of music and to some extent its 
selection of subject matter, was, in the words of Macdona, more "on the 
ball" than its competitor, the BWA.37 Highlife music was not entirely 
political, but it was nevertheless closely associated with ideas of an "Af-
rican renaissance," as it captured the optimistic spirit of a time when 
more Ghanaians and Nigerians actually had disposable incomes for 
which they required bank accounts. 
Not only had the public reaction been a success, but the bank's sav-
ings and deposits increased to a greater degree than its directors had an-
ticipated.38 Whether this was entirely due to advertising, or to one film 
in particular, is doubtful. Nevertheless, it does indicate that the bank's 
promotional activities met with some success. A second savings film, 
Wahala Kamot (by the British animator Dick Taylor), followed in the 
1960s that worked the winning elements of its predecessor in a similar 
manner. The film's protagonist, a successful African Barclays customer, 
was featured dispensing advice, thus Africanizing the bank's image. 
In the 1960s, however, the paternalism that was evident in Bar-
clays' films became less tenable. 
"Progress and a Bright Future" in the 1960s 
Ghana became independent in 1957, and Nigeria threw off its colo-
nial status in 1960. Africans were now in charge of both government 
and administration, and they increasingly took up important posts in 
35 Brian Macdona, "Visit to Sierra Leone and Ghana, February-April 1958," verbatim notes 
from dictaphone, 27, BGA 38/382 (4) (hereafter Macdona, "Visit to Sierra Leone and Ghana"). 
36 Macdona, "Visit to Sierra Leone and Ghana," 72. 
37 Ibid., 27. 
38 Richard Fleming and E. V. Whitcombe, "Nigeria and the Cameroons," 23 July 1960, 19, 
BGA 80/3466. 
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the economy as well. The popular belief of the 1950S that prosperity 
and economic growth were the natural companion of African self-
determination made it easier to expect that the 1960s would be a "de-
cade of development." When prices for tropical commodities stagnated, 
and then declined, after 1955, countries drew on their sizable sterling 
balances, and marketing boards' profits were skimmed off for develop-
ment projects and conspicuous consumption. Failing development pol-
icies and economic mismanagement were factors that contributed to 
the military coups that toppled both Ghana's and Nigeria's govern-
ments early in 1966, but they did not entirely destroy the belief of Afri-
cans and foreigners alike in the countries' potential for development. 
The ads discussed in this section were published in West Africa 
magazine, one of the highest-quality publications of its time.39 In 1987, 
the magazine had a weekly circulation of 22,000, half in Africa, half in 
Europe and North America, reflecting the change in readership, which 
had once been limited to European expatriates in the 1930S and 1940S 
but had come to include African politicians, intellectuals, and business-
men, both in Africa and abroad. At its most successful, its publisher 
distributed 14,000 copies a week in Nigeria alone. 40 Most companies 
operating in West Africa advertised in the magazine, and they normally 
ran the same campaigns in West Africa and in the local press. The maga-
zine was a crucial advertising tool, as it reached the elites and decision-
makers in Africa, Europe, and North America. 
The portrayal of Africans in British company advertising changed 
drastically, beginning in the late 1950S and continuing through the 
1960s. Representations of a traditional people made way for depictions 
of a new type of African: the upwardly mobile urban progressive. This 
transformation is best illustrated by UAC's ad "Men of Tomorrow," 
which emphasizes progress, training, and manufacturing. 
In this ad, the UAC underlines its role in developing local skills 
through training, but the company also displays its industrial creden-
tials in the bottom half of the picture, where the text is framed by 
cranes, ships, lorries, towers, planes (the symbols of modernity, progress, 
and development), and the occasional palm tree (to remind consumers 
that the ad is a depiction of West Africa). The slogans embody the spirit 
ofthe "decade of development": the concepts of skill and technology are 
conveyed hand in hand with the idea of industrial investment. The Afri-
cans pictured in the ad epitomize the 1950S businessman, and the 
39 Kaye Whiteman, "Obituary: David Williams," Independent, 23 Sept. 1993; "David Wil-
liams," TImes, 17 Sept. 1993. 
4°This is presumably in the late 1970S and early 1980s. See David Pallister, "Media: A 
Rift between Continents-David Pallister on a Power Struggle between London Editor and 
Lagos Bosses, " Guardian, 3 Sept. 1990. 
Stephanie Decker / 70 
Removed for copyright restrictions 
UAC ad, "Men of Tomorrow: The Sales Manager," 1959. (Source: West Africa magazine, 
Jan. 16, 1960, p. 64. Reproduced with kind permission of Unilever.) 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Corporate Legitimacy and Advertising / 71 
setting could have equally been in North America or Europe. Again, ex-
amples of modem equipment, such as a typewriter and a telephone, ac-
company the main image. The visual framework, featuring an energetic 
young African salesman in the center, is that of a pyramid, and the 
chart behind the desk in the office shows rising sales figures, all visual 
clues that suggest movement and upward advancement. As the univer-
sal values of the development discourse became dominant, smiling 
farmers in need of guidance were banished from ads and young profes-
sionals were brought in. 
The components of "Men of Tomorrow" are in stark contrast to the 
features of an earlier UAC campaign featuring colonial people that ran 
in 1955. "Colonial Customers" describes Africans in terms recognizable 
to Europeans. The UAC ad displays an inventory of traded commodities 
in a panel next to a market scene containing African women clothed in 
traditional attire, selling items to a man in a Western shirt and hat. 
Female economic activity is described as circumscribed by tradition, 
a point that is underlined by the downcast gaze and passive pose of a 
woman in the photograph adjacent to the text. 
Both Barclays and BWA still used print ads in 1960 that were not 
very different from the ones they had published in 1945. BWA contin-
ued to advertise its services to investors in West Africa in terms of "spe-
cialist knowledge solidly acquired through long experience." At the 
same time, Barclays showed off its local knowledge, as demonstrated in 
its ad paying tribute to Accra's surfboat crews, ending with the state-
ment that Ghana was a "steadily progressive country. "41 
By the 1960s, advertising campaigns had changed. They reflected 
an increased African readership as well as an audience made up of Eu-
ropean investors. Barclays' campaign, however, remained oddly pater-
nalistic, relying on humorous depictions of black children, representing 
their home countries' bright futures. In this campaign, children emu-
lated professional adults. One of the ads (not shown here) depicts a 
young girl posing as a teacher. She stands at a blackboard looking 
boldly at her "class" of dolls over a turned shoulder. However, her as-
sertive stance is undermined by the fact that she is dressed only in un-
derpants and shoes and socks. The texts of the ads explicitly connect 
the children's growth to the maturing of their countries, emphasizing 
the opportunities that were opening up for them. 
The bank managed not only to point out its own contribution to 
this bright future but also continued to represent itself to European 
readers as an expert with "unrivalled knowledge of local conditions and 
market trends." The layering process remained in other print ads of the 
41 Barclays, • Accra," West Africa, 9 Jan. 1960. 
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time, as the new theme of development only partially superseded the 
old claims of regional expertise, reflecting an attempt to cover all bases 
and to address the widest possible audience. Such a strategy was ratio-
nal at a time when experts believed that African societies were "in tran-
sition" (from traditional to modern), and magazines like West Africa 
were read by expatriate administrators and businessmen, as well by as 
their emerging African successors. 
The Bank of West Africa countered Barclays' campaign in the same 
year with its "Progress" series, which has a more industrial feeling, 
showing a refinery, a factory, and a ship at a loading dock. Despite the 
series' documentary appearance, the images are drawings, not photo-
graphs, rendered in a clear, solid style, and the ad is almost devoid of 
human beings. Drawings might have been used either to avoid repro-
duction costs or to offset the lack of detail in photographs. The ad's 
"modern" images contrast with the colonial-style logo of the bank, an 
oval containing a palm and an elephant, a commonly used combination 
in West Africa. While the bank had deferred to local sensibilities by 
dropping the word "British" from its name in the 1950S, surprisingly it 
did not alter its imperial-style logo, suggesting that it remained some-
what ambivalent about ceding this aspect of its identity. 
In the text, the bank points out its willingness and ability to serve 
as an economic development resource. Like Barclays, this new service 
was added to its old function of supplying regional expertise, highlight-
ing the fact that many of the banks' large customers were still foreign 
investors. Claims of local expertise remained part of banks' advertising 
even in the 1970S, when Barclays launched a campaign in which-in a 
reversal of financial flows-it presented itself as an experienced advisor 
to Nigerian investors abroad.42 
The ads described show the type of campaign that ran in the 1960s. 
All of them, however, began to incorporate the subject of development, 
whether in their texts or in their images, or in both. None was quicker to 
do this than the UAC. The final ad discussed in this section, which was 
published in 1960 under the title "Change in West Africa," is a good 
point of comparison for a UAC ad that appeared ten years later and dealt 
ostensibly with the same subject but applied a different treatment in re-
sponse to contemporary economic and political crises. In the earlier ad, 
shown here, a closed hall replaces the traditional open market, repre-
senting the arrival of progressive economic relations. The new build-
ing, epitomizing "change," is modern, but its location in the middle of 
a traditional market scene suggests that it was designed to fit neatly 
42 Barclays Bank Nigeria, "How Barclays Can Help to Protect Your Business Interest in 
Other Countries,· Management in Nigeria (Nov. 1976): 33. 
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with existing institutions. Hence, the "change" referred to in the title im-
plies that ongoing traditions are being upgraded, or improved. 
In the text, UAC connects its own and West Africa's past and current 
history, maintaining that the company had, since its inception, worked 
for the area's economic development. The UAC listed all the benefits it 
offered to Ghana and Nigeria, mainly in the categories of investment 
and know-how. West Africa's needs, however, were seen purely in eco-
nomic terms. Indeed, as one of its past achievements, the company, re-
markably, listed "stimulating the desires that make progress possible," 
a goal that radical authors like Walter Rodney would later identify as a 
cause of the region's underdevelopment and continued dependence. 
Already, in the 1950S, the advertising industry faced criticism in the 
United Kingdom for stimulating "unnecessary" desires and needs. 43 
Multinationals were still tolerated in African societies, but in the 
late 1960s, they began to encounter more hostility in the international 
environment. 
A Crisis of Corporate Legitimacy 
A final ad reflects the crisis of West African states and the rise of 
radicalism in the 1970s. While that decade is usually associated with 
the increased power of third-world countries, especially those possess-
ing oil deposits, it also represented a phase of worldwide economic 
slowdown and import-substitution policies in the developing countries 
(with the exception of South Korea and Taiwan). Political volatility and 
military dictatorships became commonplace in Africa. Ghana returned 
to democracy in 1969 for three years, only to witness another military 
coup in 1972. Nigeria continued to be ruled by the military from 1966 
until the late 1970S, although the regime changed in 1975. The discov-
ery of oil fueled regional, ethnic, and religious tensions over the distri-
bution of public funds. The secession of the eastern region in 1967 led 
to the Nigerian civil war, which lasted until 1970. 
By 1970, the Nigerian federation had prevailed, and the attention of 
the military government shifted to the economy. In 1968 and 1969, com-
pany legislation was updated, forcing foreign businesses to incorporate 
locally and to fulfill local content requirements. In 1972, the first Nige-
rian enterprise promotion decree was promulgated, ensuring Nigerian 
participation in business by forcing existing foreign owners to sell to 
Nigerians. The categories requiring Nigerian ownership were roughly 
43 For an influential criticism of advertising, see John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent 
Society (London, 1974, 1st ed., 1958), 150-51; and Schwarzkopf, "They Do It with Mirrors," 
135-7. See also Frank Trentmann, "Beyond Consumerism: New Historical Perspectives on 
Consumption," Journal o/Contemporary History 39 (2004): 376-81. 
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determined by levels of capital, technological sophistication, and degree 
of expertise necessary to maintain operations. Foreign businesses were 
forced to sell equity or assets of either 100 percent or 40 percent. Nor-
mally, small enterprises involved in comparatively "simple" economic 
activities, such as retail trade, passed into Nigerian hands. The decree 
applied mainly to resident Lebanese and other African nationals. The oil 
and petroleum sector was covered by separate legislation. 44 
In Ghana, such business-participation programs had come into 
force in 1968 and 1969, and they mainly targeted smaller foreign com-
panies, especially those owned by Lebanese businesspeople. Balance-
of-payments problems had limited the free convertibility of money, and 
companies' leeway to repatriate profits had been curtailed. Ghana was 
in the throes of a major economic crisis that continued through the 
1970S and 1980s; it followed Nigeria's example by promulgating a de-
cree in 1975 that forced foreign businesses to sell to indigenous owners. 
As African politicians in less developed countries became aware of 
global developments in the 1960s and 1970S, they resorted more often 
to expropriations of corporate property.45 The graph shown in Figure 1 
does not demonstrate a widespread takeover of control by less devel-
oped countries. Cases involving the transfer of most of a company's 
shares did not necessarily result in local control, as management and 
technical contracts were common, in effect leaving operational, and 
often strategic, control in the hands of the former owners. The graph 
does show, however, that around 1970 companies encountered their 
first expropriations. Thus, the managers had to be aware of the rising 
tide of global economic nationalism that potentially endangered their in-
vestments abroad. Business leaders had no way of knowing in advance 
44Thomas Biersteker, Multinationals, the State, and the Control of the Nigerian Econ-
omy (Princeton, 1987). See also Adeoye Akinsanya, Economic Independence and Indigenisa-
tion of Private Foreign Investments: The Experiences of Nigeria and Ghana (Columbia, 
S.C., 1982). 
45 Geoffrey Jones, The Evolution of International Business: An Introduction (London, 
1996),293. Most expropriations occurred in Mrica (52.1 percent), followed by Latin America 
(28.7 percent) and North Mrica and the Middle East (25.9 percent) according to Kobrin for 
the time period 1960-79. British firms were also most likely to be expropriated in Africa (49 
percent), but less likely than their peers to lose their investment in the Middle East (19 per-
cent) or Latin America (8 percent). This might reflect different regional distribution. Inter-
nationally, the manufacturing sector was worst affected (26 percent), followed by petroleum 
(17.7 percent), mining and finance (12.1 percent), and agriculture (8.8 percent). Here, British 
experience diverged distinctly: extractive companies were most affected (30 percent), then fi-
nance (20 percent), followed by manufacturing (15 percent) and agriculture (13 percent). The 
United States' investment in Latin America probably explains why British companies were 
affected differently than the overall pattern suggests. For the international figures, see 
Stephen J. Kobrin, "Expropriation as an Attempt to Control Foreign Firms in LDCs," Inter-
national Studies Quarterly 28 (1984): 336; for British companies, see Fiona Boyd, "Expro-
priation of Alien Property in International Law: A Study of Recent State Practice Concerning 
British Nationals' (M. Phil. diss., University of Nottingham, 1988), 37, 43. 
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Figure 1. Incidents of expropriation acts against multinational companies worldwide, 1960-
85; and against British companies, 1965-85. (Source: Charles R. Kennedy, "Relations be-
tween Transnational Corporations and Governments in Host Countries: A Look into the 
Future," Transnational Corporations 1 (1992): 69; Fiona Boyd, "Expropriation of Alien 
Property in International Law: A Study of Recent State Practice Concerning British Na-
tionals" [Master's thesis, University of Nottingham, 1988], 29.) 
that many transfers of ownership would not always entail a loss of con-
trol, but, no matter what the circumstance, they still would have sought 
ways to protect their investments. 
The final ad embodies, as few others do, the crisis of neoclassical 
development theories and the response by business. It appeared shortly 
after the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. The timing and location 
of its publication are interesting: the ad was carried in Nigeria, a maga-
zine directed to a culturally conscious black audience. 46 The 1970-71 
edition in which the ad was published featured readers' poems criticiz-
ing African women for using skin-lightening creams and lamenting the 
cultural dominance of white beauty ideals. 
The title chosen by UAC, "the LAND, the GROUP and the ROLE," 
was a response to this changing climate, and the images reflect each 
part: The land is evoked by a sketch of skyscrapers, suggesting progress 
and development. Interestingly, it is the only image that is not a photo-
graph, and the insubstantial style in which the skyline is rendered 
seems to suggest either receding hopes or a distant future. The ad's 
46 Nigeria had been founded in the late 1940S by a colonial education officer, originally as 
a private initiative. Its success prompted the Nigerian colonial government to take over the 
magazine as a quarterly publication on the arts and culture in Nigeria. As a state-owned ven-
ture, it was presumably taken over by the independent Nigerian state, but information on the 
subsequent fate of the magazine is patchy. Colonial Office, Colonial Annual Reports: Nige-
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theme is similar to that of "Men of Tomorrow," in that the group is rep-
resented by a smiling young African executive, in this case pointing to-
ward the UAC logo. A photo insert of what is possibly a textile factory 
shows an African supervisor instructing a worker, thereby passing on 
his knowledge and ensuring productivity. By pointing to the machine, 
he mirrors the gesture of the young executive. These images recall the 
visual language used in the "Men of Tomorrow" campaign, and they 
propagate the same values. Most critically, the text gives a good idea of 
the changed environment the company was facing by the 1970s. 
By 1970, most of UAC's profits came from Nigeria, and the majority 
of Unilever's revenue came, in turn, from UAC. Hence, both subsidiary 
and parent had become dependent on the West African country.47 UAC 
began to emphasize its contributions to the country's development in 
order to protect its valuable assets and profits from expropriation. The 
UAC claimed, in "the LAND, the GROUP and the ROLE," that it was ex-
tending itself wherever need arose, that it was helping to support edu-
cation, and that it was sharing the life of the community. Its concerns 
were "social welfare ... youth, ... and the affairs of the needy." The first 
section of the text stresses the company's social role, a contrast to its 
earlier orientation toward training and supporting the country by cre-
ating growth. With this shift in emphasis, the company appeared to 
address concerns about the social costs of development. 
The second section of the ad, however, covers more familiar terri-
tory. UAC's managers serve to "further the progress ... of the people of 
the Land" and to improve efficiency and standards; the resulting "bene-
fits ... are shared with the Land." In this long text, the company sup-
plies a new interpretation of development, one that is less technocratic, 
less focused on large-scale industrial projects, and more concerned with 
the welfare of people, inspiring its determination to create jobs, provide 
social support, and ensure a wider, more equitable spread of economic 
gains. Essentially, the initial idea of development as growth has been 
superseded by the notion of development as a path leading to greater 
welfare and equality in society. 
However, the UAC tried to connect the idea of growth as a basic ne-
cessity with the notion of equality. Clearly, a company could not sub-
scribe to a radical notion of redistribution, but it could easily accommo-
date different ideas about growth. Theories of underdevelopment no 
longer cast multinationals as engines of growth but referred to them as 
agents of exploitation, a designation that stripped foreign business of 
its legitimacy. While "the LAND, the GROUP and the ROLE" illustrates 
47 Fieldhouse, Merchant Capital, 620, 718, 721, 762, 774; Geoffrey Jones, Renewing Uni-
lever (Oxford, 2005), 57, 79, 197. 
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a firm's attempt to counter this perception, eventually, in the discourse 
of the 1970s, firms were unable to come up with new sources of legiti-
macy for their activities. British companies defended themselves with 
worn-out arguments and resorted to their old strategy of seeking con-
nections to administrators and politicians in order to influence policies. 
These connections were considerably harder, though not impossible, to 
achieve in Nigeria and Ghana when military rulers were in place, as 
they were for most of the period from 1966 to 1979. 
In the 1970s, all large foreign companies were eventually forced to 
sell parts of their equity locally; however, only a few lost control of their 
investments. Among the latter were the British banks in Nigeria and 
the timber operations run by the UAC in Ghana. The legislation's im-
pact was relatively limited because the Nigerian government did not 
seek to break all ties with multinationals but continued to subscribe to 
a capitalist, relatively open economic system. Although the Ghanaian 
government took a more radical approach, it nevertheless allowed for-
eign companies to continue their operations. The country also showed 
that it respected international property rights by paying compensation. 
Impoverished Ghana was hardly able to nationalize all foreign busi-
nesses, whereas Nigeria, flush with petrodollars, would have been able 
to nationalize many more. Hence the threat of nationalization was less 
intense in West Mrica than it was, for example, in Tanzania, Egypt, 
Iran, Uganda, or some Latin American countries.48 
While the rise in expropriations seems impressive, it did not result 
in a global transfer of corporate power, and, by the late 1970s, the chal-
lenge to corporate legitimacy in the developing world seemed to abate. 
Even in cases where majority ownership became local, the relevant 
technology was sometimes patented; management and service con-
tracts had often been agreed to earlier; or qualified staff were simply 
not available and had to be hired back from the previous owners. 
Elite Discourse and Corporate Legitimacy 
The ads I have analyzed in this article often served more than one 
purpose and were directed to more than one type of audience. However, 
the ongoing discourse between elites in politics and business was crucial. 
48 Robert TIgnor, "Decolonization and Business: The Case of Egypt; Journal 0/ Modern 
History 59 (1987): 479-505; Robert TIgnor, "The Suez Crisis of 1956 and Egypt's Foreign 
Private-Sector,· Journal 0/ Imperial and Commonwealth History 20 (1992): 274-97; Car0-
line Piquet, "The Suez Company's Concession in Egypt, 1854-1956: Modem Infrastructure 
and Local Economic Development; Enterprise & Society 5 (2004): 107-27. For Iran in the 
1950S, see Geoffrey Jones, Banking and Oil: The History o/the British Bank o/the Middle 
East, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1987). For Latin America, see Paul Sigmund, Multinationals in 
Latin America: The Politics o/Nationalization (Madison, Wise., 1980). 
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The print ads were placed in prominent magazines and newspapers, 
which were read by the proportion of the population in West Africa that 
was literate (in the 1950S and 1960s, this segment rarely equaled more 
than one-third of the whole) and reasonably well educated. 49 
The Barclays' savings film, Put una money for there, however, with 
its stated intention of imbuing the (often illiterate) African farmer with 
the idea of thrift and with a savings account, seemed to address a differ-
ent audience altogether. The strong attraction of its highlife music, sung 
in Pidgin English, suggests that the semiliterate, semiskilled, newly ur-
banized "intermediate" groups of West African society were most effec-
tively targeted. This class, sandwiched between the national elites and 
the poor subsistence farmers, was politically most powerful during de-
colonization. Politicians like Kwame Nkrumah drew their support from 
its members, who had precisely the most to gain from independence 
and economic development and whose votes were important to nation-
alist politicians. 
Despite the efforts of the bank to present the film at agricultural 
shows, it is doubtful that the rural population comprised its main view-
ers. The film reached a wider audience in urban areas, where it was 
shown in cinemas. In 1954, Nigeria had forty commercial cinemas; the 
Gold Coast, twenty-eight. In the Gold Coast, seventeen of these movie 
houses were in major urban centers like Accra, Kumasi, and Sekonki-
Takoradi; the rest were in smaller provincial hubs. In Nigeria, thirty of 
forty cinemas were in the western region and in LagoS.50 Thus it was 
unlikely that a large proportion of the rural population had a chance to 
see it. Nevertheless, the presence of movie houses was not the whole 
story. Colonial governments all across the continent experimented with 
mobile film units. In the Gold Coast, so-called Aban cinemas, or gov-
ernment mobile film units, were established in 1940.51 Thus, while au-
diences must have been predominantly urban, the film probably 
reached rural audiences to some extent. 
49 In Ghana literacy rose from between 19 percent to 23 percent for males around 1950 to 
43 percent for males and reached 17 percent for females in 1970. In Nigeria, English literacy 
was lower C.1950, between 10 and 15 percent, but it also rose to 31 percent for men and came 
to 10 percent for women in 1970. (The percentages refer to people age fifteen and over.) Rich-
ard Jolly, Planning Educationfor African Development: Economic and Manpower Perspec-
tives (Nairobi, 1969), 104, table IV-l; Frederick Cooper, Africa since 1940: The Past of the 
Present (Cambridge, 2002), 114, table 2. 
so Colonial Office, Report on the Gold Coastfor the year 1954 (London, 1956), 104; and 
Report on Nigeriafor the year 1954 (London, 1958), 188. Although Nigeria's western region 
was rural, it was also affluent and densely inhabited due to cocoa farming. 
51 Collins, "A Social History; 19. For an image from 1950, see Colonial Office, Colonial 
Reports: Gold Coast, 1950 (London, 1952), between pp. 54 and 55. While there is no infor-
mation on West Africa, in Zimbabwe these units showed ads before and after films. Timothy 
Burke, Lifebuoy Men, Lux Women: Commodification, Consumption, and Cleanliness in Mod-
ern Zimbabwe (Durham, N.C., 1996), 141. 
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However, when it was first presented in West Africa, local manag-
ers questioned the representation of Africans in the film, underlining 
how important the opinions of African elites were to the bank. Brian 
Macdona pointedly remarked at an agricultural show in 1958 that the 
governor-general had approved of Barclays' advertising. 52 That Put una 
money for there was mentioned prominently by Julian Crossley, the 
bank's chairman, at the annual general meeting suggests a political 
subtext of the savings campaign: it was an exercise designed to gain the 
approval of African and British colonial elites for the project. 
The representation of Africans in corporate advertising changed 
from bystanders (in BBWA's early print ads) or types (in UAC's cam-
paign around 1950) to customers and employees (in Barclays' film and 
UAC's "Men of Tomorrow" ad). This marked an important shift in per-
ception as Africans came to be portrayed in more active and assertive 
roles. By 1970, UAC was using the image of an African manager. It is 
not clear to what degree these ads were negotiated by creative agencies 
and firms or whether African imagery mattered in this process at all.53 
The transposition of corporate intentions into the visual and textual 
shorthand of advertising, and its reception in Africa, Europe and North 
America, still requires further research. 
Conclusion 
The plan to develop its tropical colonies offered a new source of le-
gitimacy, not only to British imperialism but also to British business. 
While this new justification of imperial rule remained short-lived and 
could not prevent the arrival of independence of Ghana in 1957 and of 
Nigeria in 1960, it remained relatively uncontested in the business world 
until the late 1960s and 1970s.54 By the 1960s, companies were recon-
structing their corporate images, stressing their willingness to cooperate 
in the progress of West Africa and their ability to deliver capital and 
know-how to aid the region's development. Firms began to portray their 
52 Macdona. "VISit to Sierra Leone and Ghana." 27. 
53 Assertive poses cannot be equated with a "decolonized" representation of Africans. In-
digenous photography shows different poses from colonial imagery and corporate advertis-
ing. For an introduction to the debate. see Anne Maxwell. Colonial Photography and Exhi-
bitions: Representations of the WatilJe- People and the Makings of European Identities 
(London. 1999). 13-14; and the criticism by Erin Leigh Haney. "If These Walls Could Talk! 
Photographs. Photographers and Their Patrons in Accra and Cape Coast. Ghana. 1840-
1940· (Ph.D. diss •• School of Oriental and African Studies. University of London. 2004). 
182-213. 
54 Of course there had been criticism of foreign multinationals before the 1970s. most no-
tably Chief Awolowo's motion for nationalization in the Nigeria parliament in 1961. His party 
had already become the focus of foreign business criticism during decolonization. See Tignor. 
Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire. 239-41. 
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own function as serving the needs of developing economies, and thus 
they justified their presence as first-world businesses in third-world 
countries. 
After 1948, when local political reforms and decolonization began 
to dominate life in the colonies, firms slowly realized the need for an ac-
tive public-relations strategy, and this awareness had an impact on ad-
vertising. In the 1950s, companies began to refer to "development" in 
their campaigns. By the mid-1960s, advertising was taking up the 
themes of progress and industrial development. 
As advertising began to reflect development concerns, the repre-
sentation of Africans changed. In the savings film Put una money for 
there, Africans were still pictured as childlike, trapped in a traditional 
world containing few objects that pointed to the possibility of a brighter 
future. Print advertising similarly showed Africans in "typical" situa-
tions, often framed by explanatory text for European audiences. This 
perspective changed, but only slowly, during the late 1950S and 1960s. 
The UAC's "Men of Tomorrow" was the clearest break with the earlier 
tradition of advertising. Images reflected Africans' aspirations, and 
they were pictured as "young executives" in modem settings. Africa was 
no longer depicted as a "timeless" or "traditional" place, but rather as a 
site of activity, growth, impatience, and learning. However, the transi-
tion was not smooth, and colonial tropes continued to appear. Some 
new ads were either deeply paternalistic or dully technocratic. BBWA's 
campaign showed drawings of industrial installations in West Africa, 
breaking with earlier imagery, such as palm trees and surfboat crews. 
Barclays countered with a campaign featuring black children emulating 
professional adults, a representation of national development that re-
mained colonial at heart. While these ads showed, at least to some ex-
tent, a growing understanding of local aspirations, they continued to 
address the same overseas investors who had formed their audience 
before independence. 
The shift from colonial-style advertising to a postcolonial form that 
depended on themes of modernity and economic development was a 
gradual process. Old claims were retained while new features were in-
troduced, creating several layers of meaning. The changes in advertis-
ing also reflected the reality that leading positions in politics and eco-
nomic life were being filled by Africans. Political and commercial elites 
were initially the most important target audience as businesses sought 
acceptance, especially from African politicians. The development 
theme became prevalent in advertising, because it was the basis of in-
teraction among British businessmen, colonial officials, and African 
politicians. 
By 1970 advertising had adopted a noticeably more defensive tone 
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as the positive role of business in development began to be disputed by 
experts, politicians, and the wider public. Companies tried to address 
some of the new issues of social costs, equality, and redistribution. 
However, Marxist views of dependency, in particular, offered little scope 
for corporate legitimacy. Ghana, as the smaller country, experimented 
with autarky policies for a few years but returned in 1983 to a neolib-
eral framework, implementing one of the first (and most successful) 
structural adjustment programs in Africa. Nigeria experienced an eco-
nomic boom as a result of oil production and remained open to foreign 
investment, but it also initiated mandatory local participation in most 
enterprises and became notorious for corruption. In both countries, 
companies found that, over the long run, they could generally avoid 
loss of control (at the cost of entering into joint ventures with local in-
terests) by continuing to cooperate with governments. 
Although Charles Kennedy opened his 1992 article on the history of 
worldwide expropriations with the warning that the failure of struc-
tural adjustment programs might prompt a second wave of economic 
nationalism, this prophecy has not come to pass, at least so far. 55 In-
deed, the arguments put forth by British businesses in West Africa have 
endured into the new millennium, forming the basis of the United Na-
tions' suggestions for good corporate citizenship: 
There are rising expectations that TNCs [transnational companies] 
can contribute directly to the advance of development goals as one 
aspect of good corporate citizenship. Such firms are expected not 
only to abide by the laws of the host country, but also [to] pay 
greater attention to contributing to public revenues, creating and 
upgrading linkages with local enterprises, creating employment 
opportunities, raising skill levels and transferring technology.56 
Multinational companies still have to adapt their behavior to the 
expectations and demands of their respective host societies in order 
both to safeguard their property rights and to gain the goodwill of influ-
ential internal stakeholders. Making this adjustment is critical to their 
survival as businesses, because expropriations or general restrictions 
on foreign investment tend to occur in international and local climates 
in which corporate legitimacy is challenged, both economically and 
morally. Businesspeople in Africa have accepted this fact, as the follow-
ing remark in the Economist makes clear: 
55 Charles Kennedy, "Relations between Transnational Corporations and Governments in 
Host Countries: A Look into the Future," Transnational Corporations 1 (1992): 67-91. 
56 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 
2003-FDI Policies/or Development: National and International Perspectives (New York, 
2003),164. 
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Don't even dream of doing business in Africa if you're not prepared 
to leave a visible legacy .... Investing in communities is taken for 
granted. You do not get rewarded for doing it. You get punished for 
not doing it.s7 
A crucial fact to remember is that the development theme was not 
chosen single-handedly by business but was adopted to reflect host 
countries' expectations, and it depended on policies that were deemed 
appropriate by local stakeholders. 
57 Vincent Maphai, head of BHP Billiton, South Africa, quoted in "Business in Africa: A 
Flicker of a Brighter Future," Economist, 7 Sept. 2006, 81. 
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